Beijing hands Moscow a long rope
SHANGHAI - When Russian President Vladimir Putin visited China, who really got
what? Who were and are the winners in the short term and the long run? Russia
got a chunk of territory and China's endorsement of Moscow's World Trade
Organization (WTO) entry; China did not get a coveted pipeline but there were a
spate of mutually beneficial economic accords. Still, China takes the long view
and figures that it will come out on top. It may take 20 years, strategic
analysts calculate, but China sees itself the winner.
Putin paid his
third state visit to China last week, marking the 55th anniversary of the
establishment of Sino-Russian (then Sino-Soviet) diplomatic relations. Putin got
what Russia wanted from China: approval of a powerful state for Russia's
accession to the WTO. Russia and China also resolved their long-standing dispute
over their 4,300-kilometer-long borders, somewhat in Russia's favor. More than
10 (primarily economic) agreements were signed, but not the big prize - the
route of an oil pipeline. China seeks a branch from Russia's far east to China's
northeast region. Putin said directly that this should be considered from
Russia's interests. In other words, China didn't get what it wants to get from
Putin's visit, and was disappointed. The outcome, however, is linked by Chinese
analysts, and others, to the fact that China is a rising power while Russia is
the declining empire. Japan, meanwhile, is also in the running for the pipeline
and has offered huge financial incentives to Moscow.
More generally,
people in China have all kinds of misunderstandings and questions over
Sino-Russian relations, and are unwilling to agree with Putin that Sino-Russian
relations are enjoying the best period in their history. They consider that
there is a phenomenon of "upper hot while lower cold" - politics hot while
economy cold - and naturally there is distrust between the two. The An-Da
(Angarsk to Daqing) oil line has not been resolved and its possible death -
though not actually confirmed - was especially damaging to China's perception of
Russia.
There is a saying that even in the Chinese countryside, the old
women complain that Russians are too snobbish, cannot be trusted; many people
think Sino-Russian relations are an example of those in which each makes use of
the other to show dissatisfaction with America's unipolar hegemony, and so
ties are just symbolic and temporary. At the same time, the new Chinese
leadership, without the background of being educated in Russia and without
personal relationships with Russian leaders, makes such worry rational and
natural.
How should we understand the future of a Sino-Russian strategic
partnership? Is it simply a revival of the 1970s China-America-Russia strategic
triangle in which China joins Russia against the United States? Or does it mean,
from the standpoint of some Americans who wanted to improve diplomatic ties with
Beijing to offset the Soviet superpower, that "my enemy's enemy is my friend"?
China-America-Russia, a new strategic triangle?
Considering
their military power and influence on world affairs, China-US-Russia relations
do have the impact of a strategic triangle. China and Russia do disagree with
and resist America's strategic pressure and unilateral hegemony. Although the
Sino-Russian strategic partnership is not targeting the third party, the United
States, the common consensus between China and Russia does have the effort of
balancing US unilateralism.
Russia is yesterday's superpower, the US is
today's only superpower and China will be tomorrow's world power. This is the
key to understanding the new strategic triangle involving China, the US and
Russia. In other words, the United States has had more space to develop in order
to reach the peace bonus since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Right now China is keeping a low profile but preparing to do what
it wants to do and what is in its own best interest. The decline of Russia is
not over yet. This will influence the dynamics of the China-US-Russia strategic
triangle.
After the killings by separatists in Beslan, North Ossetia,
last month, former US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski published an
article in the Wall Street Journal portraying Putin as Moscow's Benito
Mussolini. He criticized the administration of US President George W Bush in
supporting Putin's dictatorship in the name of anti-terrorism. Someone even
suggested that if Senator John Kerry were elected president, the United States
should add Russia to the "axis of evil", joining Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Iran,
and North Korea. Another report is that the US wants to dismember Russia and the
independence of Chechnya is the starting point. Russia's disintegration would
have a second, even a third wave of repercussions.
If this is true, then
under such circumstances, Russia's strategic need for China is increasing. China
also must consider the potential strategic conflict over the Taiwan issue with
the US, paying considerable attention at this time to the Sino-Russian strategic
partnership. That comes as no surprise. A Russian partner would be helpful if
the situation in the Taiwan Strait deteriorated and the US entered the conflict.
However, China's huge market and rising influence in international affairs make
America's anxiety over China's developing much less than over Russia's
development. Because of a high degree of economic interdependence and
comprehensive cooperation in international affairs, Sino-US relations are
actually among the closest in the world. So the weak point of the
China-Russia-US strategic triangle lies in the Russian side, because of its
weakness and need for the United States.
But the Sino-Russian
relationship has its own logic, which has surpassed the meaning of the
China-Russia-US strategic triangle.
The logic of the Sino-Russian
relationship
Besides providing a balance to the US superpower with its
unipolar world view, China and Russia coming closer together has other
rationales. To make their exchanges economically and politically beneficial,
cooperation and enhancing their mutual consensus have three aspects.
1. Exchange. Sino-Russian relations are very pragmatic. Each side
calculates carefully: what can the other side provide for me? Both parties are
simply concerned with their own demands, not interdependence, and are even
unwilling to give what the other side wants. For instance, Russia exports oil to
China while keeping another eye open to Japan, selling more advanced weapons to
India than to China, slighting the Chinese side. The reason is that since
Russia, which is the weak side, is more limited in its strategic choices than
China, Russia is concerned more about the rise of China than China is concerned
about the rise of Russia.
In the political arena, there is mutual
support for China and Russia in dealing with domestic issues: I support your
attacks on terrorism and separatists of Chechnya; you support my endeavors
against Taiwan's independence. Compared with the more difficult cooperation in
energy (Russia fears China's rise and Japan offers lucrative pipeline
inducements), terrorism, Chechnya and Taiwan are solid and reliable issues for
both sides.
2. Win-win. To pursue a stable and long-term
relationship, Sino-Russian relations must surpass the level of exchanges and
simple trade, creating the win-win effect. Putin's China visit reveals it
clearly. Both sides are eager to develop relations, narrow the gap between
Russia and China and focus on fundamental, absolute concerns (terrorism and
Taiwan). As a result, Sino-Russian relations have great potential. For instance,
on the petroleum-piping alignment, Putin said this should emphasize the
development of Russia's far east region, bringing the necessary cooperation
between both nations in the region - and in China's northeast as well. The key
is, can both sides bring this into the broad perspective of regional
integration?
3. Consensus. On the international level, in
maintaining domestic stability and in their development models, the two nations
share great common consensus. There is a saying that Russia is following Deng
Xiaoping's pragmatic reform model. Both sides uphold political multilateralism,
oppose hegemonism and oppose the double standards of anti-terrorism.
The
problem is - with this logic and common ground - how to evaluate the strategic
development period and space of the Sino-Russian strategic cooperative
partnership?
How long will Sino-Russian strategic cooperation
last?
Since last year, after the standoff of the pipeline alignment from
Russia's Angarsk to China's Daqing oil refinery, Putin promised to increase
railroad transport to China and increase Sino-Russian cooperation in developing
natural gas, which is clearly the intentional compensation to the failed
pipeline plan and a repair for Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership.
The difference between railroad and pipeline reflects Russia's
inflexible and incomplete attitude in dealing with China relations. The reason
may be Russian worries about China's rise and the effect of such rising on
Russia's security, but China also doubts whether Russia will maintain its
domestic stability. So China pays more attention to diversifying its petroleum
and weapon imports, spreading the strategic risk and not being dependent on a
single large supplier. With the reduced reliability of Russia's resources for
China's energy-hungry economy, Russia's weight in the view of China's strategic
thinking will be devalued.
At the same time, after Sino-Russian
relations enter what should be the fast track for economic development, Russia
is dragging its feet in the development of its power resources, and is lagging
behind in its ideas for the future. Both countries are now in the stage of
post-socialist reform, their common mission. But once China enters the upper
level of economic reform, Sino-Russian relations will wittiness a qualitative
change, revealed by China's different expectations, compared with Russia's,
concerning the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia continues to believe
the SCO should focus on striking three forces - terrorism, separatism and
fundamentalism - while China hopes primarily to move the SCO to the level of
economic cooperation. When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited Russia last month,
he consistently suggested building up Eurasia as a free-trade zone with Russia,
but he was rejected by his Russian counterpart. The reason appears to be that
Russia feels it is in crisis and manifests a siege mentality. Moscow appears to
believe that if a free-trade zone were established, then Russia's economy and
the regional Central Asian economies would actually be controlled by China, and
Russia would thereby lose its political influence in the former Soviet
republics.
Another factor influencing Sino-Russian strategic cooperation
is the United States. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US
leaders estimated that five terms of four-year presidency - 20 years - would be
needed to finish the initial task of fighting terrorism. Therefore,
anti-terrorism, as the common pursuit, provides the possibility of 20 years of
the new strategic triangle involving China, the US and Russia. Sino-Russian
joint statements contain many words about anti-terrorism and anti-proliferation,
which helps to make the US more comfortable with the advance of Sino-Russian
relations.
After the Cold War, especially after September 11, 2001, the
international structure stepped into a period of great adjustment. Once that
adjustment period ends, Sino-Russian strategic cooperative partnership will
cross its own threshold and realize its own strategic possibilities. To the
extent that such changes impact the mutual perception between China and Russia,
ie, what benefits I derive from Sino-Russian ties is greater than what I fear
from the other side, then China-Russia relations will reach the turning point.
This buildup period is expected to last for 20 years. According to a widely
accepted economic estimation, by 2020 China will become the second-largest
economic entity after the United States. Then the asymmetric Sino-Russian
relations will have to through the pattern of strategic partnership (recognizing
China's dominance), or it has to be changed.
How much potential space
for a strategic partnership?
Because China and Russia are neighbors and
great powers, each has its own great strategic goal, so if Sino-Russian
relations will not be put into the Asia-European integration network, the
strategic period of the Sino-Russian relationship will meet its end.
Particularly, the potentialities and future for Sino-Russian strategic
partnership lies in the Middle Asian integration after the transition of the SCO
and East-Asian integration following the six-party talks on the North Korean
nuclear crisis. It would be difficult for a pure bilateral exchange and mutual
Sino-Russian political support to seize and benefit from the development of
economic globalization and regional integration.
Compared with their
political relations at present, Sino-Russian economic relations are too weak and
unvarying and lacking dynamism and creativity. To date, Sino-Russian cooperation
is still driven by two engines: energy and anti-terrorism. Russia promises to
transport 8 million tons oil to China this year, increase that to 10 million
tons next year, and to 15 million tons by 2006. But China's oil imports from
Russia are just 8.5% of its total oil imports. China has been the second-largest
consumer and importer in the world since last year. It is still a question
whether China's oil imports from Russia can meet the rising demand.
Ninety-five percent of Russia's exports to China are energy resources,
while China's exports to Russia primarily are value-added industrial products.
If both countries can realize the dream of extending the bilateral trade from
today's US$20 billion to $80 billion per year, it will be very necessary to
expand the new realms of cooperation with new visions in many areas.
So,
during Putin's visit to China, the main topic for discussion was long-term
cooperation over high-value-added products, including space flight, atomic
energy, engineering, manufacture high technology and information technology.
Putin's state visit to China came just two weeks after Chinese Premier
Minster Wen Jiabao's visit to Moscow. During Wen's visit, Russia made a
commitment to increase supplies of crude oil to China; China also promised to
invest $12 billion to Russian infrastructure by 2020. It seems that increasing
the extent of interdependence for both sides, not just increasing the amount of
trade, but also optimizing the trade structure, will provide a solid base for a
strategic, mutually reinforcing partnership.
From the strategic
position, China is the stronger player. The Sino-Russian strategic partnership
should and will be used by China to serve its grand strategy of peaceful rise.
So to understand Sino-Russian strategic partnership, we should examine it from
the point of view of the strategic period and space of China's grand strategy.
To grasp the coming 20-year strategic opportunity period, winning time at the
cost of space is the basic choice for China. Now we can understand why
Sino-Russian borders, disputed for years, finally have been settled somewhat in
Russia's favor. The strategic period and space of Sino-Russian relations are
compatible with China's grand strategy, and should have more potential in the
future.
By Yiwei Wang is the assistant to the dean of the Institute of
International Studies, Fudan University.
Source: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FJ20Ad03.html